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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15503 
BRENT LESLIE DOCK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of assault by 
a prisoner, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-102.5 (1953), as amended, in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was charged by information with 
aggravated assault by a prisoner in violation of Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-5-103.5 (1953), as amended. The defendant was 
tried by a jury and on October 13, 1977, he was convicted 
of the lesser included offense, assault by a prisoner, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.5 (1953), as amended. The 
defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
more than five years, to run consecutively with his 
current term. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The witnesses at trial presented conflicting 
facts; however, they were in agreement as to the general 
series of events. 
On the night in question, the defendant, Brent 
--
Leslie Dock, was a prisoner in Cell No. A-314 in medium 
security at the Utah State Prison. During the early 
morning hours, Officer Donald F. Morrell was making a 
cell count when he kicked a Coke can that was lying in 
front of the defendant's cell (R.204). The defendant 
and the officer exchanged words at that time (R.204). 
The officer passed in front of the defendant's cell a 
short time later, and at that time the defendant threw 
the can (R.191,204). The defendant claimed he was merely 
throwing the can over the rail (R.191), and the officer 
testified that the can struck him (R.204). Words were 
-2-
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again exchanged at the defendant's cell (R.206), and the 
officer informed the defendant that he would be written 
up for hitting an officer (R.206). 
Jack Manneh came on duty at 6:00 a.m. that same 
morning and was instructed by his supervisor to transport 
Dock to maximum security. At about 6:10 a.m., Officer 
Jack Manneh went to the defendant's cell to take him to 
maximum security (R.142). Officer Manneh was accompanied 
to the cell by Officer Wells (R.146), and Officer Morrell 
was at the control panel for the cell doors (R.147). The 
balance of the testimony is in great conflict. Officer 
Manneh testified that he spoke to the def.endant before he 
entered the cell and before the doors were opened, and 
informed the defendant that he had been instructed to take 
him to maximum security as a result of the earlier incident 
with Officer Morrell (R.148). The officer then asked 
that the cell door be opened, and asked the defendant to 
go with him (R.149). At this time the officer testified 
that he heard breaking glass, and as he turned around he 
was attacked by the defendant with the broken glass (R.149). 
The defendant testified that he had no conversa-
tion with Officer Manneh until he had entered the cell 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R.195). The defendant testified that he told Manneh ~ 
was not going, and that Manneh then attempted to drag 
him out of the cell and in the process slipped, broke 
the jar, and hit his head (R.195). The defendant 
testified that he resisted being transported (R.197), 
because he did not feel the officers were justified in 
moving him to maximum security. 
Officer Wells, who accompanied Manneh to the 
cell, testified that Manneh conversed with the defendant 
before entering the cell (R.212). Wells also testified 
that he saw the broken glass in Dock's hand, and that 
Dock went toward Manneh (R.213). Wells grabbed Dock 
from behind, but did not observe the details of the 
scuffle between Manneh and Dock (R.213). 
All parties agreed that at the time of the 
incident the lighting was fairly poor, but that there 
was some light (R.158,216). 
Officer Manneh admitted and Officer Wells 
confirmed that he was not seriously injured by the 
events, and that he incurred only minor scratches on 
his neck and head (R.224,175). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A GENERAL CRIMINAL INTENT IS REQUIRED UNDER 
-4-
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UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-103 (1) (b) AND 76-5-102 (1953), AS 
AMENDED, AND THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AS TO THAT 
INTENT REQUIREMENT. 
The basic premise in criminal law is, that in a 
crime not involving strict liability, there must be both 
an act and an intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (1953), 
as amended. It is commonly recognized that there are two 
types of criminal intent: specific and general. 
The appellant in this case was charged by informa-
tion with Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5 ·(1953), 
as amended (R.5). The following sections of the Utah Code 
are at issue in this appeal: 
"(l) Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful 
force or violence, to do bodily injury 
to another; or 
(b) A threat acccompanied by 
a show of immediate force or violence,. 
to do bodily injury to another. 
(c) Assault is a class B 
misdemeanor. " Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-102 (1953), as amended. 
"Any prisoner who commits assault, 
intending to cause bodily injury, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1953), as 
amended. 
-5-
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"(l) A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in section 
76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes 
serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon 
or such means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is 
a felony of the third degree." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953), 
as amended. 
"(l) Any prisoner, not serving 
a sentence for a felony of the first 
degree, who commits aggravated assault 
is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree. 
(2) Any prisoner serving a 
sentence for a felony of the first 
degree who commits aggravated assault 
is guilty of: 
(a) A felony of the first degree 
if no serious bodily injury was caused; 
or 
(b) A capital felony if serious 
bodily injury was intentionally caused." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5. 
The case at bar was submitted to the jury under 
Section 76-5-103 (1) (b), as it applies to Section 76-5-103.I 
(R.13). The trial court also instructed on the lesser 
included offense, simple assault by a prisoner, Section 
76-5-102.5 (R.46). The appellant's claim is that by 
failing to instruct the jury as to specific intent, the 
trial court committed prejudicial error. 
-6-
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--
There are two factors relevant to this claim that 
warrant immediate attention. Initially, the trial judge 
did instruct as to general intent (R.48), and during the 
course of his instructions he quoted from the appropriate 
statutes. Secondly, the Utah Supreme Court has already, in 
dicta, determined that Section 76-5-103(1) (a), requires a 
specific intent, and that Section 76-5-103(1) (b), requires 
merely a general intent. State v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326 
(Utah 1976). In a decision filed on April 24, 1978, ~ 
of Utah in the Interest of Lawrence Vernon McElhaney, No. 
15380, the Utah Court affirmed unanimously the Howell 
position that: 
11 
••• under § 76-5-103 (1) (b) 
UCA as amended, no culpable mental 
state is specified and thus under 
§ 76-5-102, UCA as amended, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. 11 
Section 76-5-103(1) (a), is clearly inapplicable 
to the case at bar since there was no evidence introduced 
at trial to show that Officer Manneh suffered any serious 
injury, and serious injury is required for a violation of 
Section 76-5-103(1) (a). Section 76-5-103 is worded in the 
disjunctive, and in contrast to Section 76-5-103 (1) (a), 
Section 76-5-103(1) (b), requires merely that the assailant 
-7-
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"use a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury." There is no 
intent requirement expressed for Section 76-5-103 (1) (b), 
At the close of the State's case in chief, the appellant 
moved to dismiss the information on the basis that no 
serious injury had been inflicted upon the victim (R.178), 
and that the assault was no more than a simple assault. 
The court denied the motion, ruling that as a matter of 
law it is not necessary for serious bodily injury to have 
occurred to constitute a violation of Section 76-5-103(l)(b) 
The court also stated that whether or not the broken containf 
was a weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury was a 
question for the jury (R.178). 
In his brief, the appellant has cited several 
Utah cases to support his theory that specific intent is 
an element of both simple and aggravated assault. At 
page 10 of his brief, the appellant cites State v. Nielsen, 
514 P.2d 535, 30 Utah 2d 119 (1973), for the proposition 
that specific intent is an element of simple assault. The 
case makes no reference to specific intent, and holds in 
part: 
-8-
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" in the prosecution 
for assault with a deadly weapon 
with intent to do bodily harm, 
the actual infliction of bodily 
harm need not be shown in order 
to make out the offense." 514 
P.2d at 536. 
In State v. Nemier, 148 P.2d 327, 106 Utah 307 (1944), 
the defendants effected an escape from the state prison 
by theatening guards with deadly force. The defendants 
were charged under Utah Code Ann. § 103-7-12 (1943), 
repealed, which states as follows: 
"Every convict undergoing 
a life sentence in the state prison 
who, with malice aforethought, 
commits an assault upon any 
other convict, or upon the warden 
or any guard or any other person 
whomsoever, with a deadly weapon or 
instrument of any kind, or by means 
of force, or by administering any 
poisonous or deleterious substance 
which will likely produce great 
bodily injury, is punishable with 
death." (Emphasis added.) 
It is significant that the statute itself required a 
specific intent, and that the mandatory penalty under 
the statute was death. The Utah Court stated at 331: 
"By the nature of an assault 
it does not require an intent in all 
events to kill or do great bodily 
injury, but an assault committed 
with malice aforethought, does 
require sornething more than the mere 
wish to vex or annoy the person 
assaulted. It is not necessary for 
-9-
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us to here determine what intent 
is necessary under all possible 
circumstances in order to commit 
the offense charged. " 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Potello, 132 Pac. 14, 42 Utah 396 11~ 
cited by the appellant on page 9 of his brief, the informat 
charged "specific and felonious intent to do great bodily 
harm" (132 Pac. at 15). The case does not say that specifi 
intent is an element of simple or aggravated assault. The 
holding in the case is that if an information includes a 
charge of specific intent, the information cannot be amende' 
after a plea has been entered. In a proceeding for a writ 
of habeas corpus, the Tenth Circuit Court in Green v. Turne: 
409 F.2d 215.- (1969), cited Potello, supra, and noted that 
"a conviction under the felony statute requires proof of an 
intent to do bodily harm." 4 09 F. 2d at 216. The statement 
was dicta, however, and no mention is made of the type of 
proof or intent required. 
In short, there are no Utah cases which suggest 
that specific intent is an element of either simple assault 
or aggravated assault. 
The California court, in People v. Rocha, 92 Cal.' 
172, 3 Cal.3d 893 (1971), noted at 176, that "traditionally, 
simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon have been 
referred to as 'general intent' crimes." See also ~' 
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~, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969). In People v. Morrow, 
74 Cal.Rptr. 551 at 558 (1969), the court stated: 
" ••• the trial judge took 
the position well authenticated in 
California law that the crime of 
assault by means of force likely 
to produce great bodily injury 
does not require separate proof 
of an intent to injure; the jury 
may infer such intent from the 
evidence as to what was done by 
a defendant." 
Other jurisdictions have considered the intent 
requirement for aggravated and simple assault. The 
North Carolina court found that intent was not an element 
of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious 
injury. State v. Curie, 198 S.E.2d 28, 19 N.C. 17 (1973). 
In that same opinion, the court at page 30 took note of 
State v. Lattimore, 158 S.E. 741, 201 N.C. 32 (1931), where 
the court stated: 
"It is true that an act may 
become criminal only by reason of 
the intent with which it is done, 
but the performance of an act 
which is expressly forbidden by 
statute may constitute an offense 
in itself without regard to the 
question of intent." 
A Florida Court rejected the idea that intent is required 
in simple assault, or that specific intent is required for 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and stated: 
-11-
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"Contrary to appellant's 
contention, the gist of the crime 
of aggravated assault is found in 
the charac~er of the weapon with 
which the assault is made, and the 
crime requires only a general and 
not a specific intent." Bass v. 
~' 232 S.2d 25 (Fla. App. 1970). 
In State v. Wingate, 215 N.W.2d 90, 191 Neb. 388 (1974), 
the appellant, who had been convicted of forcible assault 
on a police officer with a deadly weapon, contended that 
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
intent was an essential element of the crime charged. ThE 
court replied that "[I] ntent is not an essential element 
and there was no error in failure to instruct." 215 N.w.1: 
at 91. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in an appeal based on 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953), repealed, where the defend' 
had been found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with 
intent to do bodily harm, addressed the intent issue in ti.' 
following manner: "It is true that the State was unable t'. 
prove directly what was in the defendant's mind relative 
to doing harm to the victim;" and went on in a later 
sentence to say: "It seems almost too obvious for comment 
that the intent to do bodily harm would reasonably be 
inferred from the 'slashing' at another person with a 
hunting knife." Chief Justice Crockett also commented tha 
-12-
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it is the "elementary rule that a person is presumed to 
intend the natural and probable consequences of his 
acts." State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d 696 at 697, 22 Utah 
2d 377 (1969). 
The appellant contends that by failing to · 
instruct the jury on specific intent, the trial court 
corrunitted reversible error. It is a commonly recognized 
fact that the sufficiency of jury instructions is to be 
determined by reading them as a whole. In the case at 
bar, the court instructed the jury on aggravated assault 
by a prisoner (Section 76-5-103.5) and the lesser 
included offense, assault by a prisoner (Section 76-5-102.5) 
(R.38-48). It is the sufficiency of these instructions that 
the defendant is challenging on this appeal. The instruc~ 
tions included both a statement as to what the jury must 
find in respect to each offense and a recitation of the 
appropriate statutes. Instruction 21 contains this 
instructions on general intent: "You are instructed 
that in every crime or public offense there must be 
union or joint operation of the act and intent. The intent 
or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected 
with the offense and the sound mind and discretion of the 
accused. As used in these instructions the term intentionally 
means that an individual does something making it his 
-13-
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conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result." (Emphasis added.) (R. 48) . The 
court also instructed the jury to consider all the 
instructions as a whole (R.52). 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has decided numerou; 
cases on the sufficiency of jury instructions in the past 
decade. In State v. Puga, 510 P.2d 1075, 85 N.M. 204 
(1973), the defendant was convicted of two counts of 
robbery under a New Mexico statute that did not specificaL 
require intent. The defendant contended that intent was 
an element of robbery, and that the instructions to the 
jury were insufficient as to intent. The court held that 
even though intent was not mentioned in the statute that 
it was an element of the crime, and that an instruction 
given in the language of the statute was sufficient if the 
words informed the jury of any intent element. In ~· 
Fuentes, 511 P.2d 760, 85 N.M. 274 (1973), the court state: 
that "instructions which are phrased in the terms of a 
statute which require an intent are sufficient." 511 P.20 
at 762. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously grappled 
with the problem presented by a statute which, although no· 
expressing an intent requirement, clearly required intent 
as an element of the crime • I State v. Gallegos, 396 P,2d · 
... 14-
• 
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16 Utah 2d 102 (1964). The trial court in Gallegos, supra, 
based its instruction for manslaughter on a statute (Utah 
code Ann. § 76-30-5, repealed) that failed "to expressly 
require an 'intention to kill or do great bodily harm or 
do an act knowing the natural and probable consequences 
thereof will be death or serious bodily injury.'" 396 
P.2d at 415. The court approved the instruction even 
though the word "intentionally" was not expressly defined. 
Solely for the purpose of argument, if the trial 
court did err in not instructing as to intent for the crime· 
of aggravated assault, in this case where the defendant 
was convicted of the lesser included offense, the error 
was not prejudicial where the instruction for the lesser 
included offense was properly given. Walker v. People, 
248 P.2d 287, 126 Colo. 135 (1952); State v. Gibbons, 
364 P.2d 611, 228 Or. 238 (1961). 
In summary, the appellant's claim that the 
trial judge's failure to instruct on specific intent 
resulted in prejudicial error fails on four grounds. 
First, specific intent is not an element of aggravated 
assault as it is defined in Section 76-5-103(1) (b), or 
simple assault. The case was submitted to the jury on 
the basis of Section 76-5-103(1) (b), which this Court 
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st(lted in Howell, supra, required only a general intent. 
It should be noted that the jury rejected the aggravated 
assault charge. It is a matter of common law that the 
mens rea requirement for simple assault is general and 
not specific. Rocha, supra. Secondly, the trial judge 
did instruct as to general intent (R.48), and jury 
instructions are to be considered as a whole. Third, 
the judge's instructions were based on the statute 
defining the charges. Fuentes, supra. Finally, it is an 
accepted principle that a person is presumed to intend 
the natural and probable consequences of his act. Gallegos, 
supra. 
POINT II 
THE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT ON 
SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF HABITATION WERE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND WERE PROPERLY REFUSED 
BY THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
It is commonly recognized that a defendant in 
a criminal case is entitled to inconsistent theories of 
defense, State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1976), 
but he must present some evidence during the course of the 
trial to support the theory in order to have the jury 
instructed as to the theory. A question frequently address' 
-16-
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by courts is how much evidence must be presented to 
support a jury instruction. The Utah Supreme Court has 
discussed the problem in several cases. In State v. 
Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 23 Utah 2d 70 (1969), the Court 
stated that: 
" • • if all reasonable men 
must conclude that the evidence is 
so slight as to be incapable of 
raising a reasonable doubt in the 
jury's mind as to whether a 
defendant accused of a crime acted 
in self-defense, tendered instructions 
thereon are properly refused." 
(Emphasis added.) 457 P.2d at 620. 
The Castillo Court, supra, also stated that "the propriety 
of an instruction encompassing this principle is necessarily 
contingent on the applicability of self-defense in the case." 
457 P.2d at 620. In State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, 112 
Utah 130 (1947), the Court held that where there was no 
substantial evidence on the defense of excusable homicide, 
there was no need to instruct the jury on that issue. "It 
is admitted that the defendant is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case if there is any 
substantial evidence to justify giving such an instruction." 
185 P.2d at 743. The defense counsel in State v. Talarico, 
193 Pac. 860, 57 Utah 229 (1920), was late in the submission 
of his request for a self-defense instruction, and the 
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trial court refused to give it. The Supreme Court held 
that even though the instruction was appropriate, the 
fact that it was not given was not prejudicial error 
under the circumstances. "While the theory of counsel, 
persistently and strenuously urged, was that of self-
defense, it was nevertheless all theory and no evidence, 
all shadow and no substance." 193 Pac. at 861. 
The request alone for an instruction on self-
defense and defense of habitation is not sufficient to 
entitle the appellant to the instruction. Other juris-
dictions have examined the conditions under which the 
instruction may be appropriate. The Washington Court 
in State v. Curie, 443 P.2d 808, 74 Wash.2d 197 (1968), 
stated that "in a prosecution for assault it is not 
improper to refuse an instruction on self-defense where 
there is nothing to justify a reasonable inference that 
the defendant acted in legitimate self-defense." 443 
P.2d at 809. The New Mexico Court in State v. Romero, 
385 P.2d 967, 73 N.M. 109 (1963), used the "reasonable 
doubt" standard, and concluded that where that standard 
was not met, refusal of the instruction was proper. 
The issue in this case is whether or not the 
trial judge acted within the bounds of his discretion in 
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concluding that there was no "reasonable doubt" created, 
and that the instruction was improper. The only evidence 
that was presented at trial that might possibly support a 
self-defense instruction or an instruction on defense of 
habitation was the appellant's statement that he was 
afraid (R.195). There was no evidence presented to show 
that the entry into the cell was unlawful, or that it 
was violent or tumultuous. There was no evidence 
presented to show that defendant, as a reasonable man, 
feared that he was about to suffer bodily harm, or 
that his "houseu would be harmed. There was no evidence 
presented to show that the defendant's reaction was 
reasonable, or that the guards had on prior occasions 
entered prisoners' cells for the purpose of harming the 
prisoners. Indeed, defendant's own testimony was not 
that he struck the officer in self-defense, but that the 
officer was injured in a fall (R.195). The defendant 
testified further that he resisted being taken from his 
cell because he did not want to go to maximum security 
and that he did not think the officer had any reason to 
take him there (R.197). In short, there was no evidence 
presented to support any of the instructions offered as 
to self-defense or defense of habitation. 
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Jury instructions very similar to those offered 
by the appellant were refused by the trial court in 
People v. Perez, 286 P.2d 979 (Cal.App. 1955), and the 
court found no error where there was no evidence that 
defendant was being assaulted, nor any evidence or 
inference that he believed bodily injury was about to be 
inflicted on him. 
The defendant's request for an instruction 
under the theory of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1953), as 
amended, is totally inappropriate, even under the broad 
interpretation of habitation by the Utah Court in Statev, 
Mitcheson, supra. While it is conceivable that under prope: 
circumstances a jail cell may be viewed as a "home," there 
was no evidence presented in this case to show that the 
officer's entry was unlawful or that there was an attack 
upon appellant's habitation by the officers. 
The Utah Court in Castillo, supra, in finding tha: 
the self-defense instruction was properly refused, looked 
at the instructions as a whole and concluded that even if tl· 
self-defense instruction had been included, the result wou!C 
have been the same. The trial judge in the case at bar was 
careful to instruct on the reasonable doubt standard (R.7,L 
20), to protect the interests of the appellant, and acted 
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properly in refusing the requested instructions on self-
def ense and defense of habitation. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103(1) {b) and 76-5-102 
(1953), as amended, require only a general criminal intent, 
not a specific intent as the appellant asserts. The trial 
court gave a proper instruction as to general intent, and 
when the instructions are considered as a whole, there was 
no prejudicial error. Where the defendant was convicted 
of the lesser included offense, he cannot claim prejudicial. 
error as to the instruction given for the greater offense. 
The appellant presented no substantial evidence 
to support his theories of self-defense and defense of 
habitation, and the trial judge acted properly in refusing 
the requested instructions thereon. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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